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Note
DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROVISIONS OF
THE NEW CRIMES CODE
INTRODUCTION
The concept of double jeopardy is thoroughly imbued in
Anglo-American law.' In Pennsylvania, the plea of double jeop-
ardy, in its strictest sense, was limited to capital offenses,2 for
only in such instance was the defendant in danger "of life or limb."
3
In noncapital offenses, the same prohibition was statutorily enacted
as the pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit.4 Unfortun-
ately, the tests utilized to apply the pleas resulted in superficially
disparate results.5
The Crimes Code attempts to establish detailed criteria con-
cerning those situations in which a former prosecution for an of-
fense will preclude a subsequent prosecution. The four specific
provisions deal with subsequent prosecutions for the same offense,"
for different offenses,7 for offenses previously prosecuted in an-
1. See Comment, Double Jeopardy: Its History, Rationale and Fu-
ture, 70 DIcK. L. REv. 377 (1966); 10 P.L.E. Criminal Law §§ 151-64
(1970).
2. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kubacki, 208 Pa. Super. 523, 224
A.2d 80 (1966). In light of the Supreme Court decision in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), effectively abolishing the death penalty as it
existed prior to the decision, no plea of double jeopardy would be available.
3. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 464 (1960).
5. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 549, 30 A.2d 704
(1943) (prosecution for adultery no bar to subsequent prosecution for
assault and battery with intent to ravish on same facts; prosecution for
rape would raise the bar).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109 (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110 (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
other jurisdiction,8 and for offenses in which the previous court
did not have jurisdiction.9 Each provision will be discussed herein;
reference to previous cases will be used only as necessary to eluci-
date the new enactment. The four sections are set forth in the
Appendix.
I. Section 109. Former Prosecution for the Same Offense
Section 109 bars subsequent prosecutions for the same of-
fense in four enumerated situations: (1) prior acquittal; (2) prior
determination inconsistent with criminal liability; (3) prior con-
viction; (4) prior improper termination.10 The section primarily
represents a codification of the lay concept of double jeopardy-no
person shall be twice tried for an offense of which he has been
formerly placed in jeopardy. Such a facile statement, however,
ignores the ramifications implicit in the section. The preamble to
the provision establishes the applicability thereof: the subsequent
prosecution must be based both on the same statutes and the same
facts."
The first subsection deals with a previous acquittal, encompass-
ing a verdict of not guilty and a determination of insufficient evi-
dence.12 In both instances the provision parallels existing law."13
The subsection further prohibits prosecution for a greater inclu-
sive offense if the defendant has been found guilty of a lesser in-
cluded offense, although the conviction is subsequently set aside.
14
Such a bar is in direct contravention of the Model Penal Code"
but in accord with former Pennsylvania law, at least in respect
to those offenses formerly classified as capital.", The principal con-
cern of the ALI draftsmen focused on two situations, those in
which: (1) the state obtains a reversal of the earlier prosecution for
prejudicial error (not possible in Pennsylvania) ;17 or (2) the de-
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 112 (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109 (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
11. Id.
12. Id. at subsection (1).
13. Acquittal or conviction: Commonwealth ex rel. Walker v. Ban-
miller, 186 Pa. Super. 338, 142 A.2d 758 (1958); Commonwealth v. McEvans,
92 Pa. Super. 124 (1927); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 464 (1960). Insufficient
evidence: Commonwealth v. Light, 5 Lycoming 212 (Pa. C.P. 1956).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109(1) (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
15. MODEL PENAL CODE TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 5 § 109(1) (1956) [here-
inafter cited as TENATIVE DRAFT No. 5].
16. E.g., Commonwealth v. Jordan, 328 Pa. 439, 196 A. 10 (1938):
Defendant, upon a retrial, cannot be convicted of murder, but only
of the lesser degree of homicide of which the jury found him
guilty. Since, however, . . . he could, under the evidence, have
been found guilty of the greater crime he is not entitled now to be
discharged merely because on a retrial he can be convicted only
of a lesser offense involved in an indictment for murder.
Id. at 448, 196 A. at 16.
17. The most important question of law involved is as to the Common-
wealth's right to appeal in the circumstances. It is only where the ques-
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fendant wins an appeal on the basis that his conduct violated the
greater offense but not the lesser.'5  Apparently the legislature
felt that the bar should nevertheless operate.
The second subsection bars a subsequent prosecution if the
first prosecution was terminated in a final order or judgment for
the defendant which has the legal effect of negating any criminal
liability. 9 As illustrated in the ALI comment, such situations
would arise if, for instance, the following determinations were
made: (1) the statute of limitations had run;20 (2) the prohibitions
in other subsections of section 109 were applicable; (3) the defend-
ant had been previously pardoned for the offense; (4) the defend-
ant had been granted immunity from prosecution.21
A subsequent prosecution following a prior conviction is
barred by subsection (3) .22 The bar operates from the time of
a verdict capable of supporting a judgment is rendered, unless
failure to enter judgment is upon the motion of the defendant,
until the conviction is in some manner overturned. The prohibi-
tion in point of time is contrary to past Pennsylvania law, the
courts having stated the time of jeopardy as follows:
The plea of autrefois convict ... applies only to a convic-
tion followed by a judgment. And a verdict of guilty upon
which sentence is deferred, though a conviction in a popu-
lar sense is not a conviction in law .... A judgment upon
which a plea of autrefois conviction may be predicated
must of necessity be a final judgment.
23
The rationale behind the ALI proposal is that a determination of
guilty subjects the defendant to punishment under that judg-
ment, regardless of whether the punishment has yet been im-
posed.
24
tion is purely one of law that the Commonwealth may appeal from an
adverse ruling in a criminal case, for example where a new trial is granted
to a convicted defendant on the sole ground that the introduction of certain
evidence at his trial was prejudicial error; or where an indictment has
been quashed or judgment arrested after a verdict of guilty; or where the
defendant's demurrer to the Commonwealth's evidence has been sus-
tained. Where, however, the reason for the action of the trial, whereof the
Commonwealth complains, is based upon an admixture of law and fact, the
Commonwealth is without any right of appeal therefrom. Common-
wealth v. Melton, 402 Pa. 628, 629, 168 A.2d 328 (1961) (citations omitted).
18. TENTATIVE DRAT No. 5 at 49.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109 (3) (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
20. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 542 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
21. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 5 at 50.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109 (3) (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
23. Commonwealth v. Belles, 163 Pa. Super. 464, 469, 62 A.2d 91, 94
(1948).
24. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 5 at 52.
The final subsection bars subsequent prosecutions for the
same offense when the first proceeding was improperly terminat-
ed.25 The legislature deleted both the ALI definition of an im-
proper termination 26 and the specified instances of terminations
that would not invoke the bar.27 The questions that will thus
arise under the prohibition will conjecturally center on whether
these same instances would constitute an improper termination
under the Crimes Code. In prior cases it has been held improper
to discharge a jury in a capital case without absolute necessity,2 or
to discharge a jury without the consent of the defendant. 29 It
has been held proper to grant a severance to a defendant before
the jury is sworn,3 0 to discharge the jury because of the District
Attorney's prejudicial arguments,3 ' newspaper publicity,3 2 or flight
of the defendant,3 3 and to grant a mistrial for the protection of the
defendant.3 4 The examples shown would have been decided simi-
larly under the proposal as it was originally worded; 3 5 the basis
of the deletion is not readily apparent.
Because the various subsections are but differing possibilities
arising from the same circumstances, prosecutions based on the
same statutes and facts as previous prosecutions, it is not difficult
to envision situations in which several are applicable. An illus-
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109(4) (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
26. Except as provided in this subsection, there is an improper term-
ination of a prosecution if the termination is for reasons not amounting
to an acquittal, and it takes place after the first witness is sworn but be-
fore verdict. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 5, § 109 (4).
27. Termination under any of the following circumstances is not im-
proper:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination or waives by mo-
tion to dismiss or otherwise, his right to object to the termi-
nation.
(b) The trial court in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the
termination is necessary because:
(1) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in
conformity with law; or
(2) There is a legal defect in the proceedings which would
make any judgment enforced upon a verdict reversible
as a matter of law; or
(3) Prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom makes
it impossible to proceed with the trial without mani-
fest injustice to either the defendant or the State; or
(4) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(5) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair
trial.
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 5, § 1.09 (4).
28. Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d 177 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 310 Pa. 381, 165 A. 498 (1933) (but allowed
retrial on lesser offenses).
29. Commonwealth v. Bates, 413 Pa. 105, 196 A.2d 382 (1964).
30. United States v. Dorsch, 156 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
31. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 317 Pa. 321, 176 A. 908 (1935).
32. Commonwealth v. Kubacki, 208 Pa. Super. 523, 224 A.2d 80 (1966).
33. Commonwealth ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 422 Pa. 236, 221 A.2d 187
(1966).
34. Commonwealth ex reL. Montgomery v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 220
A.2d 859 (1966).
35. See notes 26 and 27 and accompanying text supra.
Note
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trative case is Commonwealth v. Haines.86 The defendant, a police-
man, was indicted for four offenses arising from his involvement
in a bookmaking operation. After the close of the testimony, the
trial judge submitted binding instructions for acquittal on two of
the counts, based on insufficient evidence. The jury could not
reach accord on any of the counts, and the defendant requested a
verdict of "not guilty" on the two counts for which the evidence
was insufficient. The motion was overruled and, at a subsequent
trial, the defendant was found guilty of all four counts. Un-
der Section 109, subsections (1) and (2) would mandate a prohibition
of prosecution for the two counts in issue, inasmuch as there was a
determination of insufficient evidence and such a determination
involves a legal proposition inconsistent with a subsequent convic-
tion. Under subsection (4) the termination of the first trial and
subsequent prosecution would not be improper. The superior
court, while reversing on other grounds, nevertheless stated that
"[n] othing short of an acquittal supports a plea of former ac-
quittal."3
7
The section should present few problems in administration
other than in distinguishing the applicable subsections in some
instances. The major differences from the ALI proposal concern
the ramifications of an improper dismissal. Since prior case law
in Pennsylvania is in conformity with the draft proposal, the out-
come should be the same in any event.
II. Section 110. Former Prosecution for a Different Offense
Of the four sections of the Crimes Code discussed in this
Note, section 110 may present the most problems for practitioners
because of the substantial deviation from the Model Code. As
originally drafted, section 110 relied heavily on another section
for interpretation; that section was deleted from the Crimes Code.
The rewording necessitated by the omission is at times contradic-
tory and ambiguous. Section 110 in application deals with those
instances in which a subsequent prosecution is barred by a
previous prosecution based on different statutes or different facts. 8
The first subsection bars further prosecutions if the prior pros-
ecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction39 and the subse-
quent prosecution is for any offense of which the defendant could
36. 147 Pa. Super. 153, 24 A.2d 85 (1942).
37. Id. at 169, 24 A.2d at 92 (citations omitted).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110 (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
39. As stated previously the Crimes Code definition of conviction
will overrule prior law. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
have been convicted initially.40 As such, the ban is readily
grasped-no subsequent prosecutions for included offenses-and
has been subscribed to by past decisions.
41
The subsection further prohibits subsequent prosecutions
based on the same conduct or criminal episode,42 with the proviso
that such offenses were (1) known to the appropriate prosecuting
officer at the inception of the prior trial;43 and (2) within the juris-
diction of a single court. This prohibition needed to be completely
reworded because of the deletion of the compulsory joinder provi-
sions of the Model Penal Code.44  The addition of "criminal epi-
sode" to "conduct" should make the subsection considerably eas-
ier to implement, since the connotation of "criminal episode" is
more inclusive than the explicit definition of conduct. 45 The
single court jurisdiction caveat may create some problems, for the
criteria as written is not whether the court which tried the dif-
ferent offense only had a limited jurisdiction, but whether any
one court could have heard the whole case.48  The prohibition in
this subsection is not applicable if separate trials are ordered by
the court.
The last prohibition in the subsection bars subsequent pros-
ecutions for the same conduct unless (1) the evidence necessary
for conviction is inconsistent and (2) a substantially different harm
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110(1) (i) (Supp. 1973). See Appendix
41. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Maszczynski v. Ashe, 343 Pa. 103, 21
A.2d 920 (1941); Commonwealth v. Cox, 209 Pa. Super. 457, 228 A.2d 30
(1967); Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943).
42. In some instances, the bar will merely be the inverse of that
stated in subsection (1) (i), i.e., no prosecution for the greater offense if
there was a prior conviction or acquittal of the included offense. Penn-
sylvania courts are in accord with such a bar:
[W]here a person is convicted or acquitted of a crime which is
a constituent of a greater crime, he may not thereafter be prose-
cuted for the greater crime.
Commonwealth ex rel. Papy v. Mahoney, 417 Pa. 368, 371, 207 A.2d 814,
815 (1965) (citations omitted).
43. Cases such as Commonwealth v. McNair, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 585
(C.P. Lyc. 1963), holding that an indictment for aggravated assault does
not preclude a subsequent prosecution for murder when the victim dies
would remain the same.
44. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 5, § 1.08.
45. "Conduct: An act or omission and its accompanying state of
mind or, where relevant, a series of acts and omissions." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 103 (Supp. 1973).
The standard will thus supersede former measurements such as the
"same evidence" test. See Balles v. Henry, 248 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa.
1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Garland v. Ashe, 344 Pa. 407, 26 A.2d 190
(1942); Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943).
46. Thus the bar would operate if, for instance, a court of common
pleas has jurisdiction over the gamut of offenses arising from one criminal
episode, and the defendant is first prosecuted in a municipal court for a
lesser offense. A single court had jurisdiction. For a discussion of the
various problems endemic to similar situations, see Comment, Double
Jeopardy-Municipal Prosecutions as a Bar to Subsequent State Prosecu-




or evil is intended to be proscribed by the two offenses. 47  The
draftsmen of the Model Penal Code intended the prohibition to
apply when for some reason the compulsory joinder provisions
did not operate,48 i.e., even though the second trial might be allow-
able under that section, the prosecution is nevertheless barred un-
less the qualifications of this subsection are fulfilled. As enacted,
the provision is open to a similar interpretation: if the offense is
not known to the prosecuting officer, such that subsection (1) (ii)
is not applicable, prosecution will be barred unless the above cri-
teria are fulfilled.
In light of the rewording, however, the provision may be
interpreted as a direct contradiction of the preceding subsection.
For instance, the Crimes Code proscribes voluntary deviate sex-
ual intercourse49 and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. 0
If a defendant is prosecuted for the former and acquitted, common
sense and subsection (1) (ii) dictate that he should not then be prose-
cuted for the latter on the same facts. Under subsection (1) (iii),
however, the exceptions would be activated. Each offense re-
quires proof of a fact not required by the other (consent or non-
consent of the victim) and the proscriptions are intended to prevent
a substantially different harm or evil. Voluntary deviate sexual
intercourse was presumably intended to protect society from acts
deemed loathsome; the proscription against involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse was presumably intended to protect individual
members of society and to punish those who violate such pro-
scriptions. To allow such an interpretation would seem to be
contradictory to the stated purpose of the Crimes Code; it would be
hoped that the courts ignore some past cases5 1 which permitted the
second prosecution and rely on subsection (1) (ii) instead.
Subsection (2), as with the preceding subsection, will probably
create some problems in implementation. In the Model Penal Code,
this subsection was intended to prohibit repeated prosecutions
when, for instance, the defendant is acquitted of an offense and
subsequently charged with aiding and abetting commission of the
same offense. Under the draft proposal, such repeated prosecu-
tions would not be barred by previous provisions, because the of-
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110(1) (iii) (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
48. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 5 at 57.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3123 (Supp. 1973).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3124 (Supp. 1973).
51. E.g., Commonwealth v. Balles, 163 Pa. Super. 467, 62 A.2d 91
(1948) (acquittal of indecent assault no bar for rape prosecution); Com-
monwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943) (adultery-
intent to ravish).
fenses may have arisen from different acts of "conduct" by the
defendant. 52 Since the Pennsylvania legislature added "same crim-
inal episode" to the modifying subsection, the defendant could not
be charged with aiding and abetting the same offense without
obliterating any sensible construction of "criminal episode."5 3  If
the second prosecution involves proof of a fact not inconsistent
with the previous offense, the prohibitions of subsections (1) (ii) and
(iii) already bar the second prosecution. Removed of such super-
fluous provisions, the subsection may be interpreted to permit a
subsequent prosecution if an acquittal, final order or judgment for
the defendant is set aside, reversed or vacated because of a legal
error. If such a situation occurs, the defendant may be retried
both for the same offense (under § 109(2)) and a different of-
fense under this provision. Since an acquittal cannot be set aside
by an appeal in Pennsylvania,54 this subsection is further nar-
rowed to encompass only situations where there is an appealable
final order or judgment for the defendant. Examples of such or-
ders have been previously listed.
55
Subsection (3) bars subsequent prosecutions if the previ-
ous prosecution was improperly terminated. The bar only applies
to those offenses of which the defendant could have been convicted
had the previous proceeding not been improperly terminated. By
omitting the compulsory joinder of the Model Penal Code, this
subsection invites abuse by prosecutors. For instance, a defen-
dant who has committed a murder by shooting his victim could be
charged with aggravated assault. Once the defense is tested, the
prosecution could in some manner induce an improper termina-
tion, possibly by merely withdrawing from the proceedings. Since
the proceeding did not result in an acquittal or conviction or final
order for the defendant, the bars applicable thereto never arise.56
The defendant could not have been convicted of murder had the
trial continued since he was never indicted for the crime. A sub-
sequent prosecution for murder falls into none of the prohibitions
enacted. The entire subsection is further obfuscated by the refer-
ence to the definition of improper termination found in section
109.57 The definition has been deleted from the Crimes Code.5
Section 110 as enacted is not a model of clarity. The legisla-
ture, with considerable merit, added the phrase "or criminal epi-
sode" to subsection (1) (ii). With the change, lack of certainty con-
cerning the definition of "conduct" should be ameliorated. Beyond
52. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 5, § 1.08(1).
53. PA. STAT. A-w. tit. 18, § 110(1) (ii) (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
54. See note 17 supra.
55. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 110(1) and (2) (Supp. 1973). See
Appendix.
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 110(3) (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
58. See notes 25-35 and accompanying text supra.
Note
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that change, the remainder of the section is ambiguous. To have
contradictory provisions within the same section is inexplicable;
to refer to non-existent definitions is an oversight. If the intent
of the section is, first, to require all offenses arising from the same
criminal episode to be prosecuted simultaneously and, second,
to then invoke the prohibitions of Section 109 against further
prosecutions (since the situation would then be prosecutions for
the same offense), the wording could have been clearer.
III. Section 111. Former Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction
If conduct constituting an offense under Pennsylvania laws
is first prosecuted in another jurisdiction, subsequent prosecu-
tion in Pennsylvania is barred.59 The same result was reached
by judicial decision in Commonwealth v. Mills,60 in which the
defendant having been sentenced in federal court for his involve-
ment in a bank robbery, was subsequently prosecuted in state
court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the second
prosecution was barred by the first and that future cases involv-
ing similar repeated prosecutions would be determined on the
basis of whether the interests of the state were fully protected
in the first prosecution. 6' Such a test lacks judicial certainty in
that a defendant who receives a one-year sentence may be subject
to Pennsylvania prosecution if, for instance, Pennsylvania could
have imposed a ten-year sentence and the court should determine
that the brevity of the sentence did not fully protect the common-
wealth's interests. The uncertainty would arise in determining
at what point the interests of the state were sufficiently protected.
If an accomplice in the hypothetical posed were sentenced to five
years imprisonment, possibly because his conduct was more out-
rageous, the Pennsylvania court could well decide that such a sen-
tence protected the interests of the commonwealth. Thus the
defendant who was in some manner more culpable would face a
five year prison term. The defendant sentenced to a one year
term in federal court would face another sentence of up to ten
years in state court. The anomaly thus presented was alluded to
by Justice Pomeroy, who commented favorably on the more ascer-
tainable standards presented by the Model Penal Code. 62 These
standards were enacted with but minor revisions in the Crimes
Code.6 3
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
60. 447 Pa. 154, 286 A.2d 638 (1971).
61. Id. at 172, 286 A.2d at 642.
62. Id. at 173, 286 A.2d at 643.
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (Supp. 1973). See Appendix.
The applicability of the provision will be predicated on the
judicial construction given the term "conduct." Although defined
in the Crimes Code, 4 the definition solves little of the ambiguity
created by the term; the ALI draftsmen acknowledged that ulti-
mately the courts will decide the definition.0 5 For instance, it will
primarily be a matter of judicial interpretation whether a Penn-
sylvania conspiracy to rob a New Jersey bank constitutes "conduct"
such that prosecution for the robbery in New Jersey bars prosecu-
tion for the conspiracy. The conflict will be even more refined in
situations such as those encountered in Mills. A bank robbery
at gunpoint includes many manifestations of "conduct," such as
the preliminary preparation, the use of a deadly weapon, the rob-
bery itself. The Pennsylvania legislature obviated a similar diffi-
culty in Section 110 by adding "criminal episode" to the model
draft.66 It is submitted that a similar interpretation, or alterna-
tively a test of whether Pennsylvania courts would be barred had
the previous prosecution occurred in Pennsylvania, should be uti-
lized by the courts in determining the applicability of Section 111.
IV. Section 112. Former Prosecution Before Court Lacking
Jurisdiction
Section 112 in essence assures that the prohibitions on subse-
quent prosecutions will not be utilized to subvert the criminal
process in the event that a defendant should in some way ar-
range to be tried before a court lacking jurisdiction, then raise
the bar of a former prosection. The section exempts from the sanc-
tions of Sections 108-111 specific situations, those in which: (1) the
prior court lacked jurisdiction; (2) jurisdiction was fraudulently
procured by defendant; (3) the prior prosecution is held invalid
on writ of habeas corpus. Prior cases 67 are fully in accord with the
limitation and the section should present little difficulties.
CONCLUSION
The prohibitions on subsequent prosecutions enacted in the
Crimes Code are of primary importance in their delineation of
64. See note 45 supra.
65. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 5 at 37:
'Conduct' . . may include more than a single act or omission to
act. In view of the infinite number of possible factual situations,
no effort is made to be more specific. The courts must be entrusted
with interpretation of the term in light of the evident purpose of the
section to eliminate undue harassment by successive trials, so far
as that is possible.
66. See text at note 45 supra.
67. Habeas corpus: United States ex rel. Slebodnik v. Pennsylvania,
343 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. Laury, 77 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Pa.
1948); Commonwealth ex rel. Patrick v. Banmiller, 398 Pa. 163, 157 A.2d
214 (1960); Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Baldi, 181 Pa. Super. 251, 124
A.2d 390 (1956). Jurisdiction: Commonwealth v. Berger, 134 Pa. Super.
62, 4 A.2d 164 (1939).
Note
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set standards; no longer will the courts be forced to examine
what are at times conflicting precedents. Some of the minor
inconsistencies will no doubt be soon reconciled by legislative
amendment or judicial interpretation. Until such time, the precise




§ 109. When Prosecution Barred By Former Prosecution For The
Same Offense
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of
the statutes and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecu-
tion, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following
circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal. There
is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty
by the trier of fact or in a determination that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to warrant a conviction. A finding of guilty of a
lesser include doffense is an acquittal of the greater inclusive of-
fense, although the conviction is subsequently set aside.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indict-
ment had been found, by a final order or judgment for the defend-
ant, which has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated and which
necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact or a
legal proposition that must be established for conviction of the
offense.
(3) The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There
is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of convic-
tion if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which
has not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of guilty which has not
been set aside and which is capable of supporting a judgment, or
a plea of guilty accepted by the court. In the latter two cases fail-
ure to enter judgment must be for a reason other than a motion of
the defendant.
(4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated after
the first witness was sworn but before a verdict, or after a plea of
guilty was accepted by the court.
§ 110. When Prosecution Barred By Former Prosecution For Dif-
ferent Offense
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provi-
sion of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on dif-
ferent facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the
following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
conviction as defined in Section 109 of this title (relating to when
prosecution barred by former prosecution for same offense) and
the subsequent prosecution is for:
(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been
convicted on the first prosecution;
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from
the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the
appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commence-
ment of the first trial and was within the jurisdiction of a
single court unless the court ordered a separate trial of the
charge of such offense; or
(iii) the same conduct, unless:
(A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly
convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is sub-
sequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not
required by the other and the law defining each of such
Note
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offense is intended to prevent a substantially different
harm or evil; or
(B) the second offense was not consummated when
the former trial began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indict-
ment was found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment
for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated
and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required
a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established
for conviction of the second offense.
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as
improper termination is defined in Section 109 of this title (relat-
ing to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for same
offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which
the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecu-
tion not been improperly terminated.
§ 111. When Prosecution Barred By Former Prosecution in An-
other Jurisdiction
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent
jurisdiction of this Commonwealth and of the United States or
another state, a prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is a bar
to a subsequent prosecution in this Commonwealth under the fol-
lowing circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
conviction as defined in Section 109 of this title (relating to when
prosecution barred by former prosecution for same offense) and
the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct unless:
(i) the offense of which the defendant was formerly con-
victed or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently
prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the
other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to
prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
(ii) the second offense was not consummated when the
former trial began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indict-
ment was found, by an acquittal or by a final order of judgment
for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated
and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required
a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established
for conviction of the offense of which the defendant is subsequently
prosecuted.
§ 112. Former Prosecution Before Court Lacking Jurisdiction of
When Fraudulently Procured by the Defendant
A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of Section 109
of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prose-
cution for same offense) through Section 111 of this title (relating
to when prosecution barred by former prosecution in another ju-
risdiction) under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was before a court which lacked
jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.
(2) The former prosecution was procured by the defendant
without the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting officer and
with the purpose of avoiding the sentence which might otherwise
be imposed.
(3) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of convic-
tion which has been held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on a
writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis or similar process.
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